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Imitation as a mechanism in
cognitive development: a
cross-cultural investigation of
4-year-old children’s rule learning
Zhidan Wang 1*, Rebecca A. Williamson 1 and Andrew N. Meltzoff 2
1 Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA, 2 Institute for Learning and Brain Sciences, University
of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
Children learn about the social and physical world by observing other people’s acts. This
experiment tests both Chinese and American children’s learning of a rule. For theoretical
reasons we chose the rule of categorizing objects by the weight. Children, age 4 years,
saw an adult heft four visually-identical objects and sort them into two bins based on
an invisible property—the object’s weight. Children who saw this categorization behavior
were more likely to sort those objects by weight than were children who saw control
actions using the same objects and the same bins. Crucially, children also generalized
to a novel set of objects with no further demonstration, suggesting rule learning. We
also report that high-fidelity imitation of the adult’s “hefting” acts may give children crucial
experience with the objects’ weights, which could then be used to infer the more abstract
rule. The connection of perception, action, and cognition was found in children from both
cultures, which leads to broad implications for how the imitation of adults’ acts functions
as a lever in cognitive development.
Keywords: imitation, rule learning, weight, categorization, cross-culture, social learning
Introduction
The ability to learn from others’ actions sets our species apart. Human infants and toddlers have
a proclivity, rare in the animal kingdom, for imitating a broad range of acts (Meltzoff et al., 2009;
Whiten et al., 2009). This includes reproducing not only the overall outcome or endstates that others
achieve with objects, but also the precise means used to attain them. For example, after witnessing
the novel act of an adult touching a light panel with his head to illuminate it, 18-month-olds are likely
to perform this novel act even after a 1-week delay (Meltzoff, 1988). The neural basis for infant and
childhood imitation is being uncovered using electroencephalography (EEG;Marshall andMeltzoff,
2014).
Imitation has several advantages for cognitive development. Reproducing others’ precise actions
accelerates and supports cultural learning of instrumental actions and arbitrary rituals (Tomasello,
1999; Boyd and Richerson, 2005; Meltzoff et al., 2009; Herrmann et al., 2013). Instrumental innova-
tions and social routines can spread through communities through imitation, thereby leading these
behaviors to be maintained across generations and providing more opportunities for cumulative
progress.
A particular benefit of high-fidelity imitation is that it increases learning opportunities
(Williamson and Markman, 2006). Even if acts are not fully understood, children who are able
to imitate them in precise detail gain opportunities to discover a deeper meaning and cognitive
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understanding of the acts, which are first grasped only in a more
superficial manner. In this paper, we hypothesize that action
imitation can spark cognitive change and test this ideawith a novel
procedure using the categorization of objects by their weight. We
conducted these tests in two cultures, China and the USA.
What children learn from others’ actions is not limited to
specific observable movements. Children also infer and repro-
duce the goals others strive to achieve and cognitive rules that
guide others’ behaviors (for review, see Meltzoff and Williamson,
2013). For example, children imitate an adult’s intended goal
(e.g., Meltzoff, 1995), causal relations (Horner and Whiten, 2005;
Schulz et al., 2008; Buchsbaumet al., 2011;Waismeyer et al., 2015),
the organization guiding others’ acts (Whiten et al., 2006; Flynn
andWhiten, 2008; Loucks and Meltzoff, 2013), and abstract rules
(Subiaul et al., 2007a,b, 2014; Williamson et al., 2010; Wang et al.,
2015).
Evidence for what has been dubbed “abstract imitation” comes
from Williamson et al. (2010), which is the basis for the cur-
rent experiment. Children in that study saw an adult sort four
objects into two bins according to either a visual property,
color (Experiment 1), or the sounds the objects produced when
shaken (Experiment 2). When given a chance to manipulate the
objects, children in the experimental groups were more likely to
categorize the objects by these respective properties than were
controls. The children were then presented with a generaliza-
tion task—a different set of objects that differed from the orig-
inals in kind as well as in their color or the sound they pro-
duced. Although the adult never manipulated this second set,
the children in the experimental group sorted these objects by
the key object property (color or sound), suggesting that chil-
dren learned an abstract rule that could be generalized across
stimuli.
Here we extended this idea of “abstract imitation” to chil-
dren’s learning about an interesting domain in physics—object
weight. Categorizing by weight is a cognitively demanding task
for preschool children. Results from Wang et al. (2015) show
that 36-month-old children, the same age that readily learned to
sort objects by their colors and sounds, were unable to learn the
weight-sorting rule through observation and imitation. This find-
ing is in line with previous research establishing that preschool-
aged children struggle on tasks that require considering weights
independently of object appearances (Smith et al., 1985; Schrauf
et al., 2011).
Cross-cultural methods have been used to assess which aspects
of social learning are culturally universal and which vary. Over-
all, these studies have shown substantial similarity in children’s
early imitation, despite considerable differences in cultural milieu
(Callaghan et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012). For example, highly
similar reactions have been demonstrated in children from an
industrialized Australian city and children from remote Bushman
andAborigine communities (Nielsen andTomaselli, 2010;Nielsen
et al., 2014).
It is possible that the imitation of cognitive rules is susceptible
to cultural experience, and Chinese culture presents an inter-
esting theoretical test. China and other Asian countries have
been dubbed “collectivist” cultures (Markus and Kitayama, 1991;
Oyserman et al., 2002). Because of language and culture, people
raised in China are thought to place relatively more emphasis
on harmonious relationships than those raised in the USA and
other Western cultures, dubbed “individualist” cultures. Chinese
parenting practices highlight the value of groups, social cohesion,
and conformity in behavior (Jose et al., 2000). Chinese society also
emphasizes allowing others to save “Mian Zi” or “Face,” which
commonly leads to implicit and conservative expressions of one’s
opinion (Redding and Ng, 1982). Chinese child-rearing practices
may provide a fertile training ground for highlighting the invisible
rules and motivations that explain visible behaviors.
The current experiment tests Chinese children’s abstract imi-
tation of rules and compares it to Wang et al.’s (2015) existing
data set fromAmerican children. All childrenwere presentedwith
four visually-identical objects, two heavy and two light. In the
Experimental group, children saw an adult heft each object and
sort them (byweight) into two bins. Two control groups were used
to determine what elements of the demonstration were needed
to promote weight sorting. Specifically, we tested whether seeing
an intentional sorting demonstration (Experimental treatment)
was more effective for eliciting weight sorting than was seeing the
hefting acts alone (a control for “stimulus enhancement”) or the
hefting acts + the sorted endstate (a control for “emulation,” or
duplicating the endstate).
One question was whether the focus on group cohesion and
conformity in China may emphasize the underlying meaning of
others’ behavior, which would give Chinese children an advantage
in learning a non-obvious cognitive rule such as categorizing by
the invisible property of weight. However, the abstract imitation
of rules may be available during the early years in all cultures—a
cultural universal that propels further cognitive development.
Equally important to the cross-cultural aspect, we sought to
illuminate how imitation can inform theories about the rela-
tion between perception, action, and cognitive development. Past
research has suggested that reproducing specific actions may
prompt children to learn the underlying purpose of an act (e.g.,
Williamson and Markman, 2006). If this is the case, children’s
imitation of the adult’s specific weighing and “hefting actions”
(lifting up and down) may help them isolate and infer that under-
lying weight differences are the basis for categorizing the visually-
identical objects. If so, it would illuminate how action imitation
could foster the development of cognitive rules (see Discussion
for further elaboration).
Materials and Methods
Participants
The participants were ninety-six 4-year-old children. Half were
Chinese (N = 48; M = 53.06 months, SD = 3.77 months; 24
males) and half were American (N = 48, M = 48.92 months,
SD= 1.66months; 24 males). Chinese participants were recruited
from a kindergarten affiliated with a university in China, which
primarily enrolls children ofHan ethnicity. American participants
were recruited froma largemetropolitan area (the samplewas 78%
White, 16% Black/African American, 3% other, with 2% being of
Hispanic ethnicity, and 1% not reporting).
American children were tested individually in the laboratory,
and their behaviors were videotaped for subsequent scoring.
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FIGURE 1 | Photographs of the experimental materials (A), which consist
of sets of four visually-identical ducks, four visually-identical zebras,
and bins to sort the objects into. Within each set, two objects are heavy and
two are light. Row (B) shows an adult making an upward “hefting” motion,
which consisted of a full cycle of raising and lowering the object on a flat palm
as if weighing the object.
Chinese children were tested individually in a quiet room at their
school. Georgia State University’s institutional review board (IRB)
provided oversight of the project.
Materials
Four sets of four objects were used as stimuli (Figure 1A). Two sets
consisted of four yellow rubber ducks (5.5 cm  4.5 cm  5 cm)
each. The other two sets consisted of four plastic zebras
(5 cm  5 cm  4 cm). In each set, the four objects were visually
identical, but unbeknownst to the child, differed in the invisible
property of weight. For each duck set, two ducks weighed 87.5 g
(“heavy”), and two weighed 21.7 g (“light”). For each zebra set,
two zebras weighed 41.5 g (“heavy”), and two weighed 11.6 g
(“light”). Pilotwork suggested that the twoweights used in each set
were readily discriminable by untrained adults. The objects could
not be discriminated by vision or audition (none of the objects
made sound when manipulated, because the interior chambers
were either filled or empty). The objects were spatially sorted into
a two-bowled tray (23.5 cm  5 cm  4.5 cm), hereafter referred
to as “bins.”
Procedure
Each child was randomly assigned to one of three independent
experimental groups. In all groups, the procedure consisted of a
demonstration and a response period. The following three fac-
tors were counterbalanced within and between the experimental
groups: (a) child’s gender, (b) the order in which the stimuli were
presented (ducks or zebras as the first set), and (c) the side on
which the heavy objects were placed during the demonstration
(left vs. right). Each group had 16 Chinese and 16 American
children.
Demonstration Period
Experimental group: hefting+ sorting
The experimenter placed one set of objects (e.g., the ducks)
on the table in a square arrangement (approximately 12 cm 
12 cm). The two objects of one weight were located on the
right of the square, and the two objects of the other weight
were on the left. The weight difference was not visible and thus
unknown to the child. From the experimenter’s viewpoint, the
bins were placed on the table behind the objects (Figure 1B). Then
the experimenter drew the child’s attention (e.g., “It’s my turn
first”).
In this group, children saw the experimenter intentionally sort
the objects by weight. The experimenter picked up the object that
was closest to the child (and on the child’s right), put it on his
palm, and “hefted” it six times, as if to test the object’s weight by
bobbing it up and down on a flat palm in a weighing motion (see
Figure 1B). The object was then placed into the bin on the child’s
right. Next, the experimenter picked up the second object from
the child’s right side, hefted it in the same way, and placed it in the
same bin. The experimenter then hefted each of the two remaining
objects in the same way, and placed each of them into the other
bin. The experimenter had a neutral, pleasant facial expression
throughout this demonstration. The hefting motion was identical
for all objects, because the experimenter practiced doing it in the
same way for each object, and the difference in weight was so
minimal that the kinematics of the lift could be done in the same
manner.
Control-group 1: hefting+ no sorting
In this control group, the experimenter handled each object, but
did not sort them. This group was used to control for “stimulus
enhancement” that may occur when the adult handles the test
objects. The experimenter placed one set of objects on the table
in the square arrangement, and drew the children’s attention to
the objects (“it’s my turn”). Then, the experimenter picked up
each object and hefted it, exactly as in the Experimental group,
but instead of sorting the objects, each one was placed back on
the table in its original location after it was hefted. Thus, in this
control group, the children saw only the weighing process, but not
the sorting behavior.
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Control-group 2: hefting+ presorted
In this control, children saw the experimenter handle each object
and also saw the endstate of the objects sorted in the bins. The cru-
cial difference was that the experimenter never sorted the objects
into the bins. Instead, the four objects were brought on the table
already pre–sorted into the bins. This group controls for, “emula-
tion,” or duplication of the endstate array. The experimenter drew
the child’s attention (“it’s my turn”), picked up each of the objects
in turn, hefted them, and returned each to its location in the bins.
Thus, for this group the children saw the weighing behavior and
also the perceptual endstate that was shown in the Experimental
group, but the participant never saw the adult sort the objects.
Response Period
The response period was identical for all groups. The experi-
menter placed the four objects in front of the child, with the bins
behind the objects (from the child’s viewpoint, see Figure 1A).
The objects were placed in a square configuration, but the two
objects with the same weight were now switched (unbeknownst
to the children) and placed in the horizontal rows. The spatial
positioning of the objects was changed from the demonstration
period so that the children had to use the object weights, and
not simply the experimenter’s picking and placing movements,
in order to correctly sort the objects. If children only copied the
literal movements of the experimenter, they would not succeed in
sorting by weight, because the array was transformed between the
demonstration and response period as described. (Furthermore,
the location of the heavy and light objects in the front vs. back
rows was alternated for the response periods in each of the four
trials. Thus if the two heavy objects were in the row closest to the
child in the response period in trial 1, then they were in the row
farthest from the child in trial 2, etc.)
The children were given a prompt to act, but there was no
linguistic description about the content of the act. The experi-
menter simply made the neutral comment, “Now it’s your turn.”
Children were allowed to manipulate the objects until they placed
all four into the bins. If needed, the children were prompted
with the question, “Can you put them inside?” After the children
placed the four objects into the bins, the experimenter removed
the bins for later scoring. For trial 2, the children were given an
identical group of objects to sort. No demonstration was given
for this set. This second set of materials was necessary because
it was not always possible to score from the video with 100%
certainty what the child did with the heavy/light objects, because
they all were visually identical, and sometimes the child’s arm
blocked a camera view; thus we retained the bins for subsequent
scoring.
After these two trials, a visually novel set of four objects was
introduced. If the duck set was used in the demonstration, the
zebra set was used as the generalization set and vice versa. Cru-
cially, these objects also differed in their absolute weights from
the original (seeMaterials), and the experimenter did not perform
any sorting demonstration with these objects. These trials were
designed to assess whether children would generalize the weight-
sorting rule to the novel stimuli. The experimenter placed the four
objects of the generalization set on the table in a square arrange-
ment (with the heavy vs. light objects in horizontal rows, see
counterbalancing above) and children were given two response
periods as described above.
Dependent Measures and Scoring
Sorting score
The primary dependent measure is the number of trials in which
the participants sorted the four objects by weight. To be credited
with a “correct sort,” children had to group the two objects of
one weight in one bin and the two objects of the other weight in
the other bin. Each correct sort was scored as a 1, which yields a
sorting score ranging from 0 to 4 across the four trials.
Hefting score
Another dependentmeasurewas also scored—children’s imitation
of the hefting action that the adult had used (Figure 1B). There
were three components: (a) holding the object from underneath
with a flat palm, (b) hefting the object by raising the hand and
letting it fall, and (c) stabilizing the object with the second hand.
If children reproduced all the three components at least once in a
trial, they received a score of 1 for that trial. Otherwise, the score
for the trial was 0. A child’s hefting score ranged from 0 to 4 (1
possible point for each of the four test trials).
Scoring agreement
The primary scorer was a research assistant who remained unin-
formed of the participant’s group assignment and the study
hypotheses. A second scorer, also unaware of group assignment,
coded a randomly selected 25% of the participants. Intercoder
agreement was assessed using the Intraclass correlation coefficient
(ICC = 0.98). Due to IRB restrictions, videos are not available
for the Chinese children. Only the American children’s hefting
was scored. (In the American sample, three video records were
unavailable resulting in a final N = 45 for the hefting analysis.)
Results
Preliminary analyses showed no significant effects of participant
sex, the side on which the weights were placed, object type (ducks
vs. zebras), or presentation order (ducks vs. zebras first). We
collapsed across these factors in all subsequent analyses.
Object Categorization
Our first analyses test for differences in whether children sorted
the sets of objects by weight as a function of experimental group.
Children’s sorting scores were analyzed using a 2(Culture: Chi-
nese vs. American)  3(Test group: Experimental, Control-1,
Control-2)  2(Object set: Demonstration set vs. Generaliza-
tion set) repeated-measures ANOVA. Figure 2 shows the sorting
scores as a function of Culture and Test group. This analysis
revealed a significant main effect of Test group, F(2,96) = 9.03,
p < 0.001, !2p = 0.17. Follow-up pairwise comparisons (Stu-
dent–Newman–Keuls) indicated that children in the Experimen-
tal group (M = 2.50, SD = 0.95) had significantly higher sorting
scores than did children in either the Control-1 (M = 1.41,
SD = 1.18; p < 0.001) or Control-2 (M = 1.53, SD = 1.19;
p= 0.002) groups, with no significant difference between the two
controls (p= 0.87).
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This analysis also revealed several notable non-significant
comparisons. Culture showed no significant main effect,
F(1,96) = 1.91, p = 0.17, !2p = 0.02, or interaction with Test
group, F(2,95) = 0.48, p = 0.62, !2p = 0.01. There was also no
significant main effect of Object set, F(1,90) = 0.11, p = 0.74,
!2p = 0.001, or Test groupObject set interaction, F(2,90)= 0.33,
p= 0.72, !2p = 0.007.
There was evidence of generalization. Children’s sorting scores
on the Demonstration and Generalization objects were respec-
tively: Experimental group: M = 1.19, SD = 0.64, M = 1.31,
SD= 0.69; Control-1:M = 0.75, SD= 0.84,M = 0.69, SD= 0.59;
Control-2: M = 0.75, SD = 0.76, M = 0.78, SD = 0.83. No
significant difference was found between children’s performance
on Demonstration and Generalization objects, t(31) = -0.75,
p = 0.46, d = 0.18, indicating that children in the Experimental
group did just as well on sorting the novel objects by weight as
they did in sorting the ones that the adult originally used in the
demonstration–generalization. Further evidence of generalization
is that 50% (16/32) of the children in the Experimental group
sorted objects in three or four trials versus 20.3% (13/64) in the
controls, 2 (4,92)= 14.70, p= 0.005, Cramer’s V = 0.28.
We also conducted a more over-arching test of children’s per-
formance. Children’s sorting scores were compared to chance.
To calculate the chance value, we assumed that two objects
were placed into each bin (children did this on 93.9% of tri-
als). There are 24 possible arrangements of the four objects in
the two bins. By chance combinations alone, in 8 of these 24
combinations the heavy objects would be grouped together in
one bin and the light objects in the other bin. Thus, the chance
probability that the final array will consist of two objects of the
same weight placed in each bin is 0.33. Considering that there
are four trials, chance performance is a sorting score of 1.33
(4 trials  0.33). A one-sample t-test revealed that children in
the Experimental group categorized the objects by weight sig-
nificantly more often than is expected by chance, t(31) = 6.96,
p < 0.001, d = 2.50. In contrast, children’s performance in
the Control-1 (p = 0.72) and Control-2 (p = 0.35) groups was
not significantly different from chance. This same effect was
also obtained for the Chinese and American cultures tested
individually.
Hefting Behavior
This analysis assesses whether children imitated the specific “heft-
ing” act and how this interacted with their learning the cognitive
rule of categorizing the objects by weight. This question is of
interest because one way that children could learn about weight
is by imitating the motor acts of hefting (bobbing the object up
and down in the hand while supporting it), even if they did not
fully understand why the adult was doing this act. In this way,
imitation of the motor act might potentially engender learning
about the property of the object. For this analysis, we classified
children across test groups into one of three sorting types based
on their sorting scores. Children who correctly sorted the objects
on three or four trials were considered to have a high sorting score
(high sorters,n= 13). Childrenwho sorted the objects on two trials
were considered medium sorters (n = 7). Children with a sorting
score of 0 or 1 were categorized as low sorters (n= 25).
FIGURE 2 | Mean number of weight sorts (SE) as a function of test
group and culture.
FIGURE 3 | Mean hefting score (SE) as a function of sorting type.
A one-way ANOVA using sorting type (three levels) as the
between-subject factorwas conducted on children’s hefting scores.
Children’s imitation of the adult’s hefting act was related to
their sorting performance, F(2,42) = 4.04, p = 0.03, !2p = 0.16
(Figure 3). A follow-up pairwise test (Student–Newman–Keuls)
indicated that themedium sorters had significantly higher hefting
scores than did the high sorters (p = 0.01), with intermedi-
ate performance by the low sorters (see Discussion for further
consideration).
Discussion
Based on the adult demonstration, both American and Chinese
children abstracted the categorization rule of sorting objects by
weight. The low levels of sorting by the children in Control-1
(hefting + no sorting) establishes that merely seeing the adult’s
weighing actions alone is not enough to induce children to catego-
rize the objects. Control-2 (hefting+ presort) establishes that see-
ing both the adult’s hefting gestures and the final sorted endstate
is also not enough. This latter result is particularly striking and
important because the behaviors used during the demonstration
period of Control-2 closely trace those used in the Experimental
group. In the Control-2 group, the experimenter picked up the
presorted objects from the bins and returned them to the same
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position; in the Experimental group, the experimenter picked the
objects from the table and sorted them into the bins. Neither the
hefting nor the final endstate was sufficient to promote weight
sorting. We therefore suggest that the rule learning was based on
the perception and imitation of the adult’s goal-directed sorting
behavior.
Action Observation and Cognitive Rule Learning
Children who saw the experimental demonstration of categoriz-
ing visually-identical objects by the invisible property of weight
showed higher rates of sorting the objects by weight thanwould be
expected by chance. Several elements of the experimental design
indicate that the children had to go beyond copying the adult’s
specific motor actions alone to succeed. The spatial positioning
of the heavy and light objects was switched between the adult’s
demonstration and the response period. This means that if the
children duplicated the literal picking up and placing movements
of the adult, the objects would not have been grouped by weight.
Further, the objects in each set looked identical—there were no
visual cues and no auditory cues for categorizing the objects. The
finding of weight sorting is in line with arguments that children’s
categorization is not limited to considering only visual perceptual
features, but can include the consideration of invisible and internal
properties of objects (e.g., Gelman and Wellman, 1991; Gelman,
2003).
Extensive previous research has established that understanding
object weight is a challenging cognitive task for children of the age
tested here and even older (Piaget, 1951; Smith et al., 1985; Schrauf
and Call, 2009; Schrauf et al., 2011; Povinelli, 2012). During the
preschool years, in particular, children struggle to consider this
internal and invisible property in the absence of correlated visible
cues (Smith et al., 1985). Profound difficulties with weight have
also been reported in comparative work (Vonk and Povinelli,
2006; Schrauf and Call, 2009; Povinelli, 2012). The key suggestion
made in this paper is that social learning and imitation can prompt
children’s attention and cognitive inferences about the invisible
property of weight.
We come, then, to the crux of the problem: what exactly did
children learn about weight from observing the adult’s sorting
actions? One possibility is that they learned that the objects
had different weights. The hefting movements used by the adult
may be one cue to this invisible property. Seeing the hefting
act coupled with intentional sorting behavior by the adult may
have prompted children to seek an explanation for this complex
behavioral stream. A good candidate explanationmay be an inter-
nal, invisible property such as weight (for related discussions, see
Legare et al., 2010; Legare and Lombrozo, 2014; Meltzoff and
Gopnik, 2013). An additional possibility, not mutually exclusive,
is that children might have already had an inkling about object
weight and gained information about the adult’s goals or how to
behave in this contextual situation—people sort by weight.
An important characteristic of children’s weight sorting in this
experiment is that it was generalizable. The adult manipulated
only the first set of objects, but the children in the Experimental
group were equally likely to sort on the generalization trials.
This finding highlights that rules, once abstracted, can be applied
to new objects and across situations. Thus, if a child learns to
consider weight when pickingmelons, she could also consider this
invisible property in relation to other types of objects. Overall,
these current findings indicate that observing the act of cate-
gorization promoted children to make use of weight with novel
objects on new trials.
Action Imitation and Cognition
Some children were more likely to imitate the hefting acts that the
adult demonstrated. Children with medium sorting scores hefted
the objects on significantly more trials than did children who had
high sorting scores.
One function of imitating others’ hefting actions with high
fidelity is that it may afford children the opportunity to discover
the significance of behaviors that are not understood (Williamson
and Markman, 2006). Whether or not children actually under-
stand the deeper purpose of the hefting acts, children gain first-
hand experience with the weight of the objects when they imitate
the hefting behaviors. This experience may have been less impor-
tant for children who readily infered the sorting rule (the high
sorters)—indeed they may have realized that imitating the hefting
acts was unnecessary for completing the goal of categorizing the
objects by weight. However, it is possible that imitating those
specific acts with high fidelity helped the intermediate sorters to
attend to or recognize the weight difference and its significance,
and then to use this property to categorize the objects. Although
the data are too limited to draw strong conclusions, they raise
intriguing links between action imitation and cognitive devel-
opment—with action observation sparking action production,
which may direct attention, experience, and cognitive change.
Cross-Cultural Universals in Imitation
In China, there is generally a greater emphasis on conformity
and the implicit expression of ideas than in the individualistic
American culture (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman et al.,
2002). However, despite the differences in parenting practices and
cultural norms, we found no difference in children’s imitation of
the rules tested here. It is possible that culture exerts an influence
on rule imitation thatwas not detected in this experimentwith this
specific physical-based rule (vs. amore psychological attribution).
It should also be recognized that the children in both the USA
and China were recruited from middle- to upper-middle class
families, and with increasing globalization, it is possible that any
cultural differences due to traditional child-rearing practices are
not as pronounced in people of closely matched socio-economic
backgrounds. Additionally, preschool children may not have had
sufficient cultural experience to show differences thatmay emerge
later; or there may be a different developmental time course
for social rules and customs than for those based on physical
properties such as weight. One recent example showed a different
time course in the acquisition of cultural stereotypes about math
in children raised in Asian vs. North American culture (Cvencek
et al., 2014).
The findings of the current study are consistent with a grow-
ing body of research showing similarities in children’s imitation
across a variety of cultures (e.g., Callaghan et al., 2011; Nielsen
et al., 2014). Past studies have generally targeted the reproduction
of specific actions on objects while the current study targeted
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the reproduction of an abstract cognitive rule underlying such
behaviors. In early development especially, the observation and
use of others’ actions may draw primarily on cultural universals.
Children around the world may use imitation in similar ways to
learn new, generalizable information from other social agents.
Conclusion
The current study provides three contributions. First, it shows that
children’s imitation goes beyond replicating specific motor move-
ments. Children also imitate abstract rules or strategies that guide
behavior, such as rules for categorization. Such “abstract imita-
tion” (Williamson et al., 2010) is important for children’s acquisi-
tion of both instrumental skills and cultural practices. Second, this
research also suggests that a different type of imitation, specifically
children’s high-fidelity imitation of motor acts, may serve as a
lever in their acquisition of abstract cognitive rules. Children
who did not understand the weight-sorting demonstration may
have benefitted from reproducing the adult’s exact “hefting” acts.
This use of imitation of literal behavior as a mechanism for rule
learning deserves more research. Third, this research extends
previous findings of cross-cultural similarity in social learning to
an area beyond the imitation of particular acts to the imitation
of more generalizable rules (categorization rules). Overall, these
findings and others support the view that action representation
and imitation may be key mechanisms for the rapid acquisition
and spread of generalizable skills, knowledge, and customs in
human cultures.
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